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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Richard Turner Kerr appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for
grand theft by possession of stolen property.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Kerr was found driving a reported stolen vehicle and was charged with grand theft
by possession of stolen property. (PSI, p. 3; R., pp. 80-81, 84-85.) He pleaded guilty to
the grand theft charge pursuant to a plea agreement with the state. (R., pp. 82-83.)
In his presentence investigation report (“PSI”), Kerr told the investigator the
following:
During the interview, Mr. Kerr indicated some “random” person that he
did not know sold him the vehicle. He indicated he was just walking down
the street and started hanging out with this person. Mr. Kerr admitted he
knows the individual[’]s name but prefers not to say.
(PSI, p. 4.)
At sentencing, the victim of the theft made a statement, and the state
recommended a retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p. 8, L. 7 – p. 12, L. 10.) Kerr’s counsel also
recommended a rider, and corrected the PSI, noting that while it stated Kerr had five adult
felony convictions, it should have stated that Kerr had two adult felony convictions
(including the instant offense). (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 4-9; p. 14, Ls. 9-21.) Kerr’s counsel did not
challenge the remainder of the PSI’s criminal history, which showed 13 adult
misdemeanor convictions, 2 juvenile felony convictions, 17 juvenile misdemeanor
convictions, and one adult conviction with unknown severity. (See Tr., p. 4, Ls. 11-20;

1

PSI, pp. 4-10.) Kerr’s counsel noted that “I have never seen a client as young as Mr. Kerr
that has spent as much time in custody as he has.” (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 14-16.)
At the conclusion of sentencing the district court and Kerr had the following
exchange:
THE COURT: All right. Here is the sentence that I’m handing down for
the felony crime theft by receiving, possessing or disposing of stolen
property for events that occurred June 1st, 2016. The sentence is to the
custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for a fixed five-year
sentence followed by an indeterminate nine-year sentence, total sentence
not to exceed fourteen years.
So I’m going to give you one chance and one chance only to be honest,
and you’ll either tell me who you bought this from or you won’t. If you tell
me who you bought it from, I will consider a retained jurisdiction. I’m not
overly thrilled about a retained jurisdiction given your criminal history, but
I won’t consider a retained jurisdiction unless you’re honest about who
you got it from.
THE DEFENDANT: Honestly I don’t know, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Then you lied in your pre-sentence report where it says on
Page 4, “Mr. Kerr admitted he knows the individual’s name but prefers not
to say.”
THE DEFENDANT: I —
THE COURT: So I am imposing that prison sentence and remanding you
to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction today, and give you
credit for 182 days time served on that sentence.
(Tr., p. 16, L. 10 – p. 17, L. 10.) The district court entered a judgment of conviction
imposing Kerr’s sentence. (R., pp. 89-91.)
Kerr timely appealed. (R., pp. 93-96.)
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ISSUES
Kerr states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court’s questioning of Kerr in violation of Kerr’s Fifth
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination constitute
fundamental error such that the issue may be addressed on appeal despite
the lack of a timely objection before the trial court?

II.

Did the district court violate Kerr’s Fifth Amendment rights by refusing to
consider sentencing Kerr to a retained jurisdiction unless Kerr identified
the person from whom he purchased the stolen vehicle?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Kerr failed to show the district court committed fundamental error by imposing his
sentence?
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ARGUMENT
Kerr Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Imposing
His Sentence
A.

Introduction
Kerr admitted in his PSI that he knew, but did not want to reveal, the name of the

person he bought the stolen vehicle from. (PSI, p. 4.) At sentencing, the district court
asked Kerr to “tell me who you bought this from”; when Kerr stated “Honestly I don’t
know,” the court imposed Kerr’s sentence, finding that “you lied in your pre-sentence
report.” (Tr., p. 16, L. 18 – p. 17, L. 10.)
Kerr did not object below and therefore must show the district court committed
fundamental error by imposing Kerr’s sentence as opposed to retaining jurisdiction.
Because Kerr fails to show that the district court clearly violated his constitutional rights
by imposing his sentence, and fails to show that any alleged error affected his substantial
rights, he cannot show fundamental error.
B.

Standard Of Review
“[C]onstitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court exercises

free review.” Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014). However,
“[i]t is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be
made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.”

State v. Carlson,

134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Idaho’s appellate courts review
unpreserved claims of error for fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226,
245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).
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C.

The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error By Imposing Kerr’s
Sentence
Kerr concedes that because he did not object to his sentence imposition below he

must therefore show fundamental error on appeal. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3, 5-6.) In
order to do so he must show that the error: “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.” Perry, 150 Idaho at
228, 245 P.3d at 980. He cannot do so here.
1. Kerr Has Failed To Show That, In Light Of His Admission To Knowing An
Individual Connected To This Offense, That The District Court’s Request For
That Individual’s Name Would Clearly Violate Kerr’s Unwaived Fifth
Amendment Rights
A criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against compelled selfincrimination extends to sentencing. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981)
(“Any effort by the State to compel [a defendant] to testify against his will at the
sentencing hearing clearly would contravene the Fifth Amendment.”). While a guilty
plea will waive a defendant’s constitutional protections with respect to the “offenses to
which the defendant pleads guilty,” it is “not to be construed ‘as being a blanket waiver
with respect to other offenses that might be charged’” at a later time. State v. Jones, 129
Idaho 471, 475-76, 926 P.2d 1318, 1322-23 (Ct. App. 1996). The Idaho Supreme Court
has therefore held that where a district court “relinquished jurisdiction solely because
Defendant refused to waive his Fifth Amendment right and answer questions that could
incriminate him and result in new felony charges,” that the court violated the defendant’s
Fifth Amendment rights. State v. Komen, 160 Idaho 534, 540, 376 P.3d 738, 744 (2016).
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However, this does not mean that sentencing courts are prohibited from drawing
any adverse inferences whatsoever from a defendant’s silence. In Mitchell v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court made two very narrow holdings: the entry of a
guilty plea does not waive a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privileges at sentencing, and,
“in determining facts about the crime which bear upon the severity of the sentence … a
sentencing court may not draw” an adverse inference from the defendant’s silence.
526 U.S. 314, 316-17 (1999) (emphasis added). Applying those principles, the Mitchell
Court held that “[b]y holding petitioner’s silence against her in determining the facts of
the offense at the sentencing hearing”—those facts being the amount of the controlled
substance at issue—“the District Court imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise
of the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination.” Id. at 330.
But Mitchell made it clear that not all adverse inferences based on a defendant’s
silence at sentencing are prohibited:
The Government retains the burden of proving facts relevant to the crime
at the sentencing phase and cannot enlist the defendant in this process at
the expense of the self-incrimination privilege. Whether silence bears
upon the determination of a lack of remorse, or upon acceptance of
responsibility for purposes of the downward adjustment provided in
§ 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (1998), is a separate
question. It is not before us, and we express no view on it.
Id. (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that Mitchell does not stand as a
bar on all negative inferences based on a defendant’s silence at sentencing. To the
contrary, the White v. Woodall Court pointed out that while the privilege against selfincrimination applies at sentencing, “it is not uncommon for a constitutional rule to apply
somewhat differently at the penalty phase than it does at the guilt phase.” 134 S.Ct. 1697,
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1703 (2014). And indeed, noted the Woodall Court, “Mitchell itself leaves open the
possibility that some inferences might permissibly be drawn from a defendant’s penaltyphase silence.” Id. Moreover, the Court clarified that the Mitchell holding was framed
“narrowly, in terms implying that it was limited to inferences pertaining to the facts of the
crime.” Id. The Woodall Court thus concluded that 1) “if Mitchell suggests that some
actual inferences might be permissible at the penalty phase, it certainly cannot be read to
require a blanket no-adverse-inference instruction at every penalty-phase trial”; and 2)
where the defendant pleads guilty to “all of the charges he faced, including the applicable
aggravating circumstances,” that “any inferences that could have been drawn from
[defendant’s] silence would arguably fall within the class of inferences as to which
Mitchell leaves the door open.” See id. at 1704 (emphasis in original).
Here, the district court’s questioning regarding the seller of the vehicle did not
clearly violate Kerr’s unwaived Fifth Amendment rights. As a threshold matter, Kerr has
failed to show that he affirmatively asserted his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
“Ordinarily, to be afforded the protections of the Fifth Amendment, a defendant must
affirmatively invoke the privilege.” State v. Powell, 161 Idaho 774, 777, 391 P.3d 659,
662 (2017) (citing United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427, 63 S.Ct. 409, 410–11, 87
L.Ed. 376, 379–80 (1943); State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 112, 952 P.2d 1245, 1248
(1998)). A defendant has a “duty to claim the privilege … even when the government is
unquestionably attempting to compel a response.” Powell, 161 Idaho at 777, 391 P.3d at
662 (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654, 96 S.Ct. 1178, 1182, 47 L.Ed.2d
370, 377 (1976)). The record reflects that Kerr did not invoke his right to silence; rather,
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he responded to the district court’s question by stating he did not know the answer, a
statement the district court found to be dishonest. (See Tr., p. 16, L. 18 – p. 17, L. 5.)
Further, Kerr has failed to show that the district court unconstitutionally
compelled his statement about the car seller’s identity by placing him in a “classic
penalty” situation. See Powell, 161 Idaho at 777-78, 391 P.3d at 662-63; Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). To show a classic penalty, Kerr must establish that the
court asserted, “either expressly or impliedly, that invocation of the Fifth Amendment
will lead to a substantial penalty.” See Powell, 161 Idaho at 778, 391 P.3d at 663. And
even if there was such a threat, not all threatened penalties are “sufficiently compelling”
to constitute a classic penalty. Id. at 779, 391 P.3d at 664. For example, the United
States Supreme Court has held that threatening an already-convicted medium-security
prisoner with a transfer to maximum security, with a concomitant loss of privileges, wage
opportunities, and facility access, was not sufficiently compelling to violate his Fifth
Amendment rights. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35-48 (2002) (finding “[a] broad range
of choices that might infringe constitutional rights in a free society fall within the
expected conditions of confinement of those who have suffered a lawful conviction”); but
see Powell, 161 Idaho at 780-81, 391 P.3d at 665-66 (finding unlawful compulsion where
an inmate faced a “threat of denied parole [which] was a sufficiently substantial penalty
to compel [the defendant] to self-incriminate”). Here, Kerr contends the district court
“was unambiguously laying the trap” for him by asking him to reveal the name of the
seller (Appellant’s brief, p. 8), but he does not establish that considering retained
jurisdiction unless the name was revealed was a sufficiently compelling penalty. Like
McKune, Kerr had already been convicted of the crime, and like McKune’s medium-
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security and maximum-security housing options, Kerr’s options here were prison or the
“prison-like experience” of a rider. State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143, 30 P.3d 293,
298 (2001). Moreover, the “decision to relinquish jurisdiction or grant probation is
committed to the district judge’s discretion.” Id.; I.C. § 19-2601. Because Kerr has failed
to show that the court not considering a rider rose to the level of a classic penalty
situation, he has failed to show that any unconstitutional compulsion violated his rights
here.
Moreover, Kerr fails to show that the topic he was questioned on would have been
incriminating, because he fails to show his own right against self-incrimination would
cover questions about the identity of a third party. While giving the name of the vehicle
supplier would obviously incriminate the third party, Kerr fails to show this information
would be “self-incriminating,” either as to the instant offense or to other crimes. Kerr had
already pleaded guilty to grand theft by possession of stolen property (R., pp. 82-83), and
knowledge of the name of the vehicle’s prior possessor is not an element of that offense
(see I.C. § 18-2403(4)). Kerr does not allege that questions about the third party’s name
would have constituted improperly “determining facts about” the instant offense, such
that Mitchell would prohibit them. See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 316-17.
Kerr instead theorizes that had he supplied the name, Kerr himself could have
then been charged with a new crime: conspiracy to transfer a stolen vehicle. (Appellant’s
brief, p. 7 (citing I.C. §§ 49-228, 18-1701).) This appears to draw from the logic in
Komen, in which the Idaho Supreme Court reversed a district court that “relinquished
jurisdiction solely because Defendant refused to waive his Fifth Amendment right and
answer questions that could incriminate him and result in new felony charges.”
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160 Idaho 534, 540, 376 P.3d 738, 744. But this argument fails, because Kerr fails to
show that merely revealing knowledge of the co-conspirator’s name could result in a new
charge against him. A co-conspirator’s name is not an element of a conspiracy charge.
See I.C. § 18-1701; see also I.C.J.I. 1101 (allowing “another unknown person” as a model
jury instruction on the element of the co-conspirator’s identity). Furthermore, Kerr
himself had already voluntarily placed all potentially relevant facts about the hypothetical
co-conspirator into the presentence report—he described the individual’s existence,
Kerr’s interactions with the individual, and ultimate receipt of the car from the individual.
(PSI, pp. 3-4.) To the extent those facts could be relevant to a hypothetical conspiracy
charge, Kerr himself had already adduced them. This case is therefore distinguishable
from Komen, insofar as Kerr has failed to show, in light of what he had already
volunteered, that the additional revelation of the individual’s name would substantiate a
conspiracy charge against Kerr.
Along the same lines, even if Kerr can show that he had a Fifth Amendment right
not to reveal the name of the third party, he cannot show he did not waive that right. The
record reveals that Kerr himself described his interaction with the individual who sold
him the vehicle, and Kerr volunteered to the presentence investigator that he knew the
person’s name. (PSI, p. 4.) “It is well established that a witness, in a single proceeding,
may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against selfincrimination when questioned about the details,” and a “witness himself, certainly if he
is a party, determines the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry.” Mitchell, 526 U.S.
at 321-22 (citing Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951)). The Idaho Supreme
Court has similarly concluded that a witness is not precluded from “testifying voluntarily
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in matters which may incriminate him,” and that statements voluntarily made are
“admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution.” See Komen, 160 Idaho at 538-39,
376 P.3d at 742-43 (“Had Defendant submitted to the polygraph examination and made
incriminating statements, those statements may have been held not to have been
compelled and therefore admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution.”). Having
opened the door and provided information not only about interacting with the individual,
but about knowing his name, Kerr cannot claim an unwaived privilege was violated
simply because the district court asked a follow-up question about a detail—i.e., what
was the name.
Lastly, because Mitchell leaves open the question of whether permissible
inferences may be drawn from a defendant’s silence at sentencing, the district court here
did not clearly violate Kerr’s Fifth Amendment rights by basing its decision, in part, on
an inference about his honesty, and properly imposed his sentence. The district court’s
exchange with Kerr, after it imposed sentence but before deciding whether to retain
jurisdiction, was as follows:
THE COURT: … So I’m going to give you one chance and one chance
only to be honest, and you’ll either tell me who you bought this from or
you won’t. If you tell me who you bought it from, I will consider a
retained jurisdiction. I’m not overly thrilled about a retained jurisdiction
given your criminal history, but I won’t consider a retained jurisdiction
unless you’re honest about who you got it from.
THE DEFENDANT: Honestly I don’t know, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Then you lied in your pre-sentence report where it says on
Page 4, “Mr. Kerr admitted he knows the individual’s name but prefers not
to say.”
THE DEFENDANT: I –
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THE COURT: So I am imposing that prison sentence and remanding you
to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction today, and give you
credit for 182 days time served on that sentence.
(Tr., p. 16, L. 18 – p. 17, L. 10.)
Per the court’s own explanation of its ruling, it was concerned from the outset
about Kerr’s chances on a rider given his criminal history. And rightly so, because by the
age of 23 Kerr had accrued some 35 criminal convictions, and Kerr’s own attorney
conceded he had “never seen a client as young as Mr. Kerr that has spent as much time in
custody as he has.” (PSI, pp. 4-10; Tr., p. 13, Ls. 14-16.) Nevertheless, the district court
was open to considering a rider, and to giving Kerr a “chance … to be honest” about the
crime—but it informed him it would not consider a retained jurisdiction if Kerr was not
honest in responding to the court. (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 18-25.) Kerr did not provide the name,
and instead responded that he “honestly” did not know who he bought the vehicle from,
which is the opposite of what he told the presentence investigator. (Compare Tr., p. 17,
Ls. 1-2 with PSI, p. 4.) The district court therefore reasonably concluded that Kerr lied to
the presentence investigator, and was not being honest.1 (Tr. p. 17, Ls. 3-5.)
Like a negative inference justifying a sentencing guideline departure, or a negative
inference about a defendant’s remorse—neither of which the United States Supreme

1

The district court’s finding about Kerr’s honesty was by logical necessity correct:
because Kerr told the district court he did not know the name of the individual, he was
necessarily not being truthful when he told the presentence investigator he knew the
individual’s name. (Compare Tr., p. 17, Ls. 1-2 with PSI, p. 4.) Alternatively, if Kerr
was honest when he told the presentence investigator that he knew the individual’s name,
then Kerr was necessarily not being truthful to the court when he told the court he
“honestly” did not know. Because Kerr’s statements cannot both be true, Kerr was
invariably either misrepresenting what he knew to the court, or to the court’s presentence
investigator.
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Court has held unconstitutional—a negative inference about a defendant’s honesty based
on his own contradictory statements would be proper. The district court had preexisting
concerns about retaining jurisdiction, given Kerr’s criminal history. (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 2225.) And because the district court premised considering a rider on Kerr’s honesty, and
Kerr’s own admissions mean that he was necessarily dishonest with either the court or its
investigator, the district court was within its discretion to draw a negative inference about
Kerr’s honesty, and deny him the benefit of a retained jurisdiction.
Kerr is therefore unable to show, in any event, a clear violation of an unwaived
constitutional right, and accordingly fails to show the first prong of the fundamental error
test.
2. Kerr Has Failed To Show That The Alleged Error Was Not Harmless
Even if Kerr has shown that there was a clear violation of an unwaived
constitutional right, he cannot show that such a violation was not harmless. In order to
meet the third prong of the fundamental error analysis, “the defendant must demonstrate
that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that
it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245
P.3d at 978. Kerr has failed to demonstrate that the error affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
Kerr argues that “the record does not indicate” the district court used the
information before it—including the PSI, the victim’s statement, the statements of
counsel and Kerr, and Kerr’s criminal history—“in fashioning Kerr’s sentence.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.) Rather, Kerr contends that the court’s statements to Kerr
“constituted a promise by the district court that it would impose Kerr’s prison sentence,
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without the opportunity for a retained jurisdiction, if Kerr failed to reveal the identity of
the person from whom he purchased the stolen vehicle.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) Kerr
contends that when he did not provide the name the court “kept its promise and imposed
Kerr’s sentence,” and that “little doubt exists that the district court’s error affected the
outcome of Kerr’s sentencing.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)
The problem with this analysis is it ignores the district court’s statements that
indicated it did consider Kerr’s history, and as a result of that history, the district court
was not “thrilled” about retaining jurisdiction from the start. (See
- - Tr., p. 16, Ls. 18-25.)
Moreover, the district court never indicated that it would retain jurisdiction if Kerr
revealed the individual’s identity; instead, the court simply stated that if Kerr revealed the
name it would consider a rider, and if he did not, the court would not. (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 2025.) In other words, the district court never indicated that but for Kerr’s statements he
would have received a retained jurisdiction. And Kerr has not shown that if he had given
the name the court would have retained jurisdiction. As a result, Kerr has failed to show
that the district court’s alleged error affected his substantial rights, because he has not
shown that but for the claimed error, he would have been placed on a rider.
Because Kerr has not shown a clear violation of a constitutional right, nor that
such a violation affected his substantial rights, he fails to show the district court
committed fundamental error in retaining jurisdiction.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Kerr’s judgment of conviction
and sentence.
DATED this 1st day of September, 2017.
_/s/ Kale D. Gans____________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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